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Abstracts: This paper discusses the development of local loop unbundling in 
telecommunications markets throughout the European Union. It elaborates on the 
regulatory framework in Europe and provides an overview of recent experiences in 
Europe. Different types of unbundling, allowing for different types of entry and services 
provided by entrants, are discussed. This paper also explores the challenges for policy 
and regulation that arise because of unbundling and recent, related technological 
developments in the markets for fixed voice telephony and broadband internet access, 
particularly the emergence of packet-switched telephony such as VoIP. 
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major promise of the liberalization of telecommunications markets 
was the rollout of local access networks. Somewhat surprisingly, 
however, local network rollout has been rather disappointing, at least 
in the light of initial expectations. So far, local network investments have 
been narrowly targeted, mainly aimed at corporate customers in business 
districts or metropolitan areas more generally. Residential customers, 
especially in rural areas, have hardly experienced the rollout of competing 
local loops to their dwellings. Accordingly, the former monopolists still 
occupy strong positions in the national markets for local access and fixed 
telephony. 
To a certain extent, residential customers benefited from entry made 
possible by mandated access to incumbents' networks, as in the case of 
'carrier (pre)selection' (CS) and 'local loop unbundling' (LLU). Both types of 
entry allow entrants without their own local networks to reach end-users by 
                     
(*) We wish to thank OPTA, in particular Daan VRIJMOET, for providing data on unbundling in 
the Netherlands. 
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purchasing access from incumbents at the wholesale level. Two differences 
between CS and LLU are that CS requires relatively little investment by 
entrants, while in order to offer services based on LLU, entrants need to 
connect to the incumbent's local switches. In terms of required investment 
levels, LLU-based entry can be seen as an intermediate entry mode 
between CS and complete facilities-based entry. It should be noted that 
compared to CS, LLU gives entrants more control over the types and quality 
of services that they can provide to end-users, since they depend less on the 
incumbent's facilities. 
Whereas CS has been used mainly as a means to offer voice telephony, 
this turned out to be different for LLU. At first sight, it seems that LLU has 
failed to give a strong push to competition in markets for fixed voice 
telephony. Entrants leasing unbundled local lines from incumbents often only 
use them to offer broadband internet access based on 'digital subscriber line' 
(DSL) technology. The types of unbundling that are minimally needed to do 
so – 'line sharing' and 'bitstream access' – prevent entrants from directly 
offering voice telephony 1. To offer voice services, entrants traditionally 
needed a more elaborate type of unbundling ('full unbundling'), giving them 
full control of the copper pair. 
Due to technological developments, full unbundling is no longer the only 
way to enable voice services. Firstly, entrants offering DSL-based internet 
access using LLU based on line sharing or bitstream access, can offer 
'Voice over DSL' (VoDSL), a packet-switched technology for voice telephony 
that can be implemented in combination with broadband internet access for 
end-users. Secondly, consumers with a broadband connection (provided by 
incumbents or entrants) can install software on their computers, usually in 
combination with a headset, which allows them to use the internet as an 
alternative infrastructure for voice telephony. The latter option is a particular 
example of 'Voice over Internet Protocol' (VoIP). These (and related) 
developments are important since, despite the limited success of LLU in 
directly stimulating competition in voice telephony, IP-based telephony may 
indirectly lead to useful substitutes for switched voice telephony. Even if the 
uptake of full unbundling (and the supply of voice telephony by entrants 
using fully unbundled lines) may seem disappointing in several countries, IP-
based telephony may drastically change the picture in coming years. 
                     
1 Line-sharing and bitstream access enable the provision of broadband internet access while 
the incumbent can continue to offer voice telephony over unbundled lines. Both types of 
unbundling divide the copper pair spectrum so that it can be used both by incumbent and 
entrant (OECD, 2003a). See also the following section. 
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The regulatory challenges and pitfalls of LLU are well known 2. No matter 
how advanced the nature of regulatory intervention, there will always be a 
tradeoff between promoting static efficiency through competition in the short 
run, and stimulating dynamic efficiency through inducing entrants to roll out 
their own networks in the longer run 3. This tradeoff, a 'classic' dilemma in 
many utility/network sectors, is given an interesting twist though, because of 
the possibility of IP-based voice telephony. This development is not only 
important in itself, it may also facilitate competition in telecommunications 
over different types of networks, such as fixed, mobile and WiFi. 
In this paper, we discuss the development of LLU throughout the 
European Union. We will discuss some countries in more detail, to illustrate 
specific issues. As a background, the following section recapitulates the 
regulatory framework in Europe as it pertains to LLU. The section after 
provides data and country experiences that illustrate the relative success of 
LLU, both as a direct and indirect way of introducing competition in markets 
for voice telephony, and as a way of introducing competition in markets for 
internet access. Then we discuss some challenges for policy and regulation 
that arise because of LLU and related technological developments.  
?  Regulatory framework in the EU 
We start by providing some background on the technology of local 
networks and unbundling. A simplified picture of a telecommunications 
network consists of local loops that connect subscribers to 'main distribution 
frames' (MDFs), that is, the equipment at the incumbent's premises related 
to local switches where LLU is implemented, and a backbone which 
connects different local switches. The local loop refers to the "physical 
twisted metallic pair connecting the network termination point at the 
subscriber's premises to the main distribution frame or equivalent facility in 
the fixed public telephone network" (European Parliament and Council, 2000,  
p. 4). 
                     
2 For an overview of the main issues, see e.g. The Economist, "Untangling the local loop", 
Telecoms Survey, Oct. 9th 2003. 
3 This presumes that the social gains from network duplication outweigh its social costs. 
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Local loop unbundling comes in different versions: full unbundling, line 
sharing, and bitstream access 4. With an initial focus on voice telephony, full 
unbundling was required, as it gives entrants sufficient control of the copper 
pair to provide voice telephony to their customers. Fully unbundled loops are 
directly connected from the incumbent's main distribution frame to the LLU 
operator's equipment – the entrant gets full control of the copper pairs. In 
contrast, with line sharing, the incumbent remains in control and can still 
provide (voice) services to consumers, since entrants only lease part of the 
copper pair spectrum (the high-frequency, non-voice spectrum, which can be 
used for broadband internet access). Hence, shared access loops remain 
connected to the incumbent's network and consumers continue to receive 
voice services from the incumbent. The entrant installs splitters at the 
incumbent's main distribution frame and the subscriber's premises and 
connects to the shared local loop 5. Bitstream access is similar to line 
sharing in the sense that the copper pair spectrum is also shared by the 
incumbent and the entrant. The difference is that it is the incumbent that 
provides the ADSL technology and modems; entrants do not have control 
over the physical line nor are they allowed to add other equipment. Thus, 
entrants are restricted to supply services designated by the incumbent 
(usually broadband internet access). 
After the liberalization of telecommunications in the EU 15 countries in 
the beginning 1990's, European legislation was initially silent with respect to 
local loop unbundling. However, in the second half of the 1990s, LLU 
became an important issue. It was seen as a substitute to facility-based 
entry, particularly in market segments and geograpical areas for which an 
additional access network would be associated with excessively high 
economic costs. It was also considered to be an important element in giving 
network operators, who already invested in a backbone, the possibility to 
directly access consumers. 
In the early days of the liberalization of telecommunications it was left to 
the member states of the European Union to decide whether and how to 
                     
4 In some countries, bitstream access is viewed as being outside the scope of LLU policy. 
Bitstream access has also not been introduced in some countries. 
5 Shared access to the local loop is defined as "the provision to a beneficiary of access to the 
local loop or local sub loop of the notified operator, authorising the use of the non-voice band 
frequency spectrum of the twisted metallic pair; the local loop continues to be used by the 
notified operator to provide the telephone service to the public." (European Parliament and 
Council, 2000, p. 6) 
P. de BIJL & M. PEITZ   37 
 
regulate access to the local loop. Some European countries mandated LLU 
some time before European legislators became active. For instance, in 
Germany, unbundling has been required since 1996, in Denmark since 
1998, and in the Netherlands since 1999 6 7. 
In 2000, that is, before the New Regulatory Framework adopted in 2002, 
European legislation with respect to LLU was put in place: European 
legislators mandated the provision of unbundled access to the local loop 
(European Parliament and Council, 2000) 8. The general philosophy behind this 
regulation was that mandatory access is an effective way of dealing with 
persistent network monopolies, but as it reduces entrants' incentives to 
innovate and invest in networks themselves, it should be withdrawn as 
competition becomes sufficiently mature. In particular: 
"The high cost of duplicating the local access infrastructure is ruling out 
new market entrants. This is affecting the level of competition, which 
the Regulation is intended to increase by offering unbundled access to 
the local loop, i.e. by enabling new competitors to offer high bit-rate 
data transmission services for continuous Internet access and for 
multimedia applications based on digital subscriber line technology as 
well as voice telephony services." (European Parliament and Council, 
2000, p. 4). 
Mandated unbundling only applied to operators that had been designated 
by their NRAs (national regulatory authorities) as having significant market 
power (SMP) 9. Moreover, access prices (the line rentals of the local loop) 
had to be transparent, non-discriminatory, fair, and set on the basis of cost-
orientation. 
"Costing and pricing rules for local loops and related facilities should 
be transparent, non-discriminatory and objective to ensure fairness. 
Pricing rules should ensure that the local loop provider is able to cover 
its appropriate costs in this regard plus a reasonable return, in order to 
ensure the long term development and upgrade of local access 
infrastructure. Pricing rules for local loops should foster fair and 
sustainable competition, bearing in mind the need for investment in 
                     
6 The type of unbundling may be different across countries. See also the following section. 
7 Clearly, whether demanding LLU access is attractive for competitors very much depends on 
the terms at which access is offered. We address the pricing of access below. 
8 See also DELGADO et al. (2004, p. 170). 
9 "This Regulation mandates unbundled access to the metallic local loops only of notified 
operators that have been designated by their national regulatory authorities as having 
significant market power in the fixed public telephone network supply market under the relevant 
Community provisions" (European Parliament and Council, 2000, p. 4) 
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alternative infrastructures, and ensure that there is no distortion of 
competition, in particular no margin squeeze between prices of 
wholesale and retail services of the notified operator. In this regard, it 
is considered important that competition authorities be consulted." 
(European Parliament and Council, 2000, p. 4). 
To make this happen, NRAs were given the power to intervene in the 
market. This included the power to set the price for LLU. Cost-orientation of 
LLU rental is not further specified, but NRAs typically include common cost 
components and a rate of return on investments for the incumbent (this is 
also in line with the New Regulatory Framework, see below). In principle, 
interfering at the wholesale level, in particular with respect to price, is a 
temporary measure. Indeed, when the local access market is seen as 
sufficiently competitive, incumbent operators are no longer required to 
provide access at cost-orientated wholesale prices 10. 
With the approval of the New Regulatory Framework (NRF) in 2002, the 
European Union has established an updated and broader framework for 
regulatory interventions. 
"In markets where there continue to be large differences in negotiating 
power between undertakings, and where some undertakings rely on 
infrastructure provided by others for delivery of their services, it is 
appropriate to establish a framework to ensure that the market 
functions effectively. National regulatory authorities should have the 
power to secure, where commercial negotiation fails, adequate access 
and interconnection and interoperability of services in the interest of 
end-users." (European Parliament and Council 2002). 
Similar to earlier legislation, unbundled access to the local loop is a 
regulatory remedy to deal with dominance (BUIGUES, 2004). If the NRA 
establishes SMP, it must apply appropriate remedies. This has to be done 
on the basis of a list of obligations formulated in the Access Directive  as 
part of the NRF (European Parliament and Council, 2002), related to 
transparency, non-discrimination, accounting separation 11, access 
(unbundled access and resale of facilities), price control and cost 
                     
10 "When the national regulatory authority determines that the local access market is 
sufficiently competitive, it shall relieve the notified operators of the obligation laid down […] for 
prices to be set on the basis of cost-orientation." (European Parliament and Council, 2000, p. 7) 
11 Ideally, accounting separation makes it possible to track the relevant costs for providing 
access. "Accounting separation allows internal price transfers to be rendered visible, and allows 
national regulatory authorities to check compliance with obligations for non-discrimination where 
applicable." (European Parliament and Council, 2002, p. 9). However, a full separation of costs 
is impossible, in particular in the case of line-sharing. 
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accounting. With respect to the latter, high wholesale prices and price 
squeezes are explicitly mentioned. 
"A national regulatory authority may […] impose obligations relating to 
cost recovery and price controls, including obligations for cost 
orientation of prices and obligations concerning cost accounting 
systems, for the provision of specific types of interconnection and/or 
access, in situations where a market analysis indicates that a lack of 
effective competition means that the operator concerned might sustain 
prices at an excessively high level, or apply a price squeeze, to the 
detriment of end-users. National regulatory authorities shall take into 
account the investment made by the operator and allow him a 
reasonable rate of return on adequate capital employed, taking into 
account the risks involved." (European Parliament and Council, 2002, 
p. 30). 
Note that the NRA is not obliged to impose particular obligations. 
According to several NRAs (e.g. in the Netherlands and Germany), access 
regulation is typically appropriate, especially in the early stages of 
competition, when entrants have not yet rolled out alternative infrastructures. 
With this logic in mind, and in particular, to gradually eliminate distortions in 
entrants' make-or-buy decisions, OPTA (the Dutch NRA) designed a 
wholesale, cost-based price schedule for full unbundling, with the cost basis 
starting at historical costs, gradually increasing over a five-year period, to 
current or actual costs 12. After this period, KPN should be free to set a 
commercially determined line rental. The five-year period was viewed as 
being representative of a minimum recovery period for substantial 
investments such as those needed in the telecoms market 13. After a delay 
of one year, the pricing scheme was implemented. We are currently 
approaching the end of year 4. Hence, the level of line rental is approaching 
current costs (as planned), but interestingly, line rental cost has decreased, 
due to the fact that the number of lines has been growing and costs can be 
shared over more lines. It is unclear what will happen after year 5 though, as 
the outcomes of OPTA's market analyses (as a part of the implementation 
process of the NRF) are still uncertain. 
                     
12 OPTA (1999), in particular § 31. See also OPTA's press release of March 19th 1999. DOYLE 
(2000) discusses the potential commitment problem of this type of regulation. 
13 For an economic analysis supporting this claim that LLU regulation may be needed to 
stimulate competition, see DE BIJL & PEITZ (2002 and 2004a). As has been recognized by 
regulators and the academics alike, regulators have to be aware that LLU regulation may make 
investments in competing infrastructure unattractive (lease price increases over time and sunset 
clauses are proposed remedies). In addition, cost-based regulation contains the risk that 
owners of local access networks make inefficient investment decisions. See also BOURREAU & 
DOGAN (2005). 
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The European legislator recognizes that short-term competition through 
mandated access may come at the cost of long-term competition through 
investments. However, this conflict is not resolved. The Access Directive 
only states that: 
"The imposition by national regulatory authorities of mandated access 
that increases competition in the short term should not reduce 
incentives for competitors to invest in alternative facilities that will 
secure more competition in the long term." (European Parliament and 
Council, 2002, p. 9). 
Hence, although one of the key questions with respect to LLU regulation 
is raised, the NRF does not provide any indications how long-term 
investment incentives in alternative access networks can be maintained 
even though access prices are regulated. 
?  Recent developments in local loop unbundling 
To-date it may appear that LLU has failed to give a strong push to 
competition in markets for fixed voice telephony. Competition is still mainly 
based on carrier (pre)selection, also known as 'indirect access'. The 
percentage of consumers in the 15 pre-accession member states of the EU 
using direct access, that is, cases in which entrants offer telephony services 
over their own local lines or unbundled local lines leased from the 
incumbent, was 6.5% in 2004 14. Competition through direct access 
(including own local line, cable and LLU) was strongest in Denmark (18%), 
Spain (11%) and the United Kingdom (17%) 15. Table 1 depicts incumbents' 
market shares by retail revenue in the fixed telephony market, as well as the 
percentages of subscribers using an entrant for direct access in member 
states of the EU. We observe that, in terms of overall retail revenues, the 
incumbent operator's market share is over 50% in all 25 member states. 
However, a relatively low market share of the incumbent is not necessarily 
reflected in a large subscribers' share using an entrant for direct access. For 
instance, in Austria and Sweden, where the incumbent with 55% and 54% 
respectively has the lowest market share in our sample, 5% and 1% of 
subscribers respectively use an entrant for direct access. This means that 
                     
14 European Commission (2004b), p. 60. 
15 European Commission (2004b), p. 59. 
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there is substantial retail-based competition, but little infrastructure-based 
competition (including LLU) in these countries. 
Table 1 (*) 
Country Incumbent's market share (%) 
Share of subscribers using 
entrant for direct access (%) 
Austria 55.0 5.0 
Belgium 72.6 6.7 
Cyprus 99.9 na 
Czech Rep. na na 
Denmark 63.2 18.0 
Estonia na 3.0 
Finland 95.0 5.0 
France 74.2 0.5 
Germany 68.0 4.0 
Greece 85.9 0.0 
Hungary 98.8 na 
Ireland 83.0 na 
Italy 68.0 3.6 
Latvia 94.2 0.0 
Lithuania 97.1 0.4 
Luxembourg na 0.4 
Malta 100.0 0.0 
Netherlands 76.0 na 
Poland 88.7 na 
Portugal 88.3 6.0 
Slovakia 100.0 na 
Slovenia 100.0 0.0 
Spain 73.6 11.0 
Sweden 54.0 1.0 
UK 63.7 16.9 
(*) Incumbent's market share in fixed telephony market Retail revenues, December 2003, data 
for Germany and Lithuania exclude internet, market shares for Denmark and Portugal by traffic 
minutes; percentage of subscribers using an entrant for direct access, including fully unbundled 
connection or with cable access owned by an alternative operator (1 July 2004, Austria, 
Belgium, Greece, Italy, and Sweden: 31 December 2003).  
Source: European Commission (2004c), figures 18, 23. 
Let us now focus on LLU. Table 2 reports unbundled lines supplied by 
incumbents 16. Note that this is only a snapshot of the situation in July 2004 
because the landscape is changing very rapidly, as broadband access is 
expanding quickly and NRAs may modify their regulatory policies and 
decisions. 
                     
16 Note that in several countris there are, in addition, a substantial number of requested 
unbundled lines which so far have not been supplied (see European Commission, 2004c,  
p. 73). 
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It is interesting to note that in several countries, access is of one 
particular type and other forms do not play a role. This may be due to 
differences in regulatory decisions. For example, in Germany there are no 
provisions for bitstream access, and no such lines are effectively available. 
In Germany almost all lines come as fully unbundled. This is in contrast to, 
for instance, the Netherlands, where the vast majority of lines are offered as 
shared access (and bitstream access is also not used). In other countries 
the vast majority of unbundling is via bitstream access, for instance in the 
United Kingdom and Belgium. We observe that the four types of wholesale 
access, full LLU, shared-line access, bitstream access and simple resale 
access (the latter type is not depicted in table 2), play an important role in 
the EU. The use of line sharing is the most recent phenomenon: the total 
number of shared-line access increased from 191,500 for the whole EU in 
July 2003 to 1,168,828 in July 2004 (European Commision, 2004c, p. 65). This 
reflects regulatory interventions and the increasing importance of broadband 
services (see below). 
Table 2 (*) 
Country Supply of fully unbundled lines 
Supply of 
shared lines 
Supply of 
bitstream access 
Total supply of 
unbundled lines 
Austria 45,862 18 71,300 117,180 
Belgium 4,750 2,635 86,539 93,924 
Czech Rep. 10,035 10,247 0 20,282 
Denmark 53,602 26,630 56,163 136,395 
Estonia 2,652 0 0 2,652 
Finland 96,600 31,600 29,500 157,700 
France 13,066 717,654 854,205 1,584,925 
Germany 1,627,846 1,141 0 1,628,987 
Greece 932 160 21,845 22,937 
Hungary 0 0 41,064 41,064 
Ireland 305 1,195 10,990 12,490 
Italy 697,530 158 750,000 1,447,688 
Latvia 0 0 0 0 
Lithuania 0 0 2,249 2,249 
Luxembourg 2,376 0 0 2,376 
Malta 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 39,625 281,504 0 321,129 
Poland 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 4,845 0 32,525 37,370 
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 
Slovenia 0 0 911 911 
Spain 40,302 2,142 495,966 538,410 
Sweden 10,972 87,795 3,200 101,967 
UK 7,466 5,949 224,941 238,356 
EU total 2,658,766 1,168,828 2,681,398 6,508,992 
(*) DSL unbundling with fully unbundled lines supplied by the incumbent; shared access lines 
supplied by the incumbent; bitstream access lines supplied by the incumbent; total number 
(sum) of access lines (July 2004). No data available for Cyprus.  
Source: European Commission (2004c), p. 73. 
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We will now look more generally at the deployment of unbundling 
throughout the European Union. In addition to data provided by the EU, 
exhibited in table 3, we calculated the ratio of the total supply of unbundled 
lines to the total number of available local lines. This penetration ratio is a 
measure of the current potential for competition through unbundling in the 
overall market for fixed telecommunications (broadband internet access and 
voice telephony, either directly offered or by means of IP-based technology, 
offered by entrants without their own local access networks). The reader 
should keep in mind that country differences can have very different causes. 
For instance, a high take-up of LLU can sometimes be explained by the 
absence of alternative local networks (e.g. cable) or differences in the 
availability of wholesale service (e.g. bitstream access or wholesale line 
rental). 
Table 3 (*) 
Country PSTN local 
lines (million) 
Total supply of 
unbundled lines 
Agreements 
with entrants 
Unbundling 
penetration (%) 
Austria 2.99 117,180 78 3.92 
Belgium 4.50 93,924 26 2.09 
Cyprus 0.42 na na na 
Czech Rep. 3.52 20,282 4 0.58 
Denmark 2.11 136,395 22 6.46 
Estonia 0.43 2,652 7 0.61 
Finland 2.73 157,700 0 5.79 
France 33.83 1,584,925 32 4.69 
Germany 37.50 1,628,987 95 4.34 
Greece 5.60 22,937 13 0.41 
Hungary 3.60 41,064 18 1.14 
Ireland 1.59 12,490 13 0.79 
Italy 26.60 1,447,688 225 5.44 
Latvia 0.60 na na na 
Lithuania 0.82 2,249 17 0.27 
Luxembourg 0.24 2,376 6 0.97 
Malta 0.21 na na na 
Netherlands 7.80 321,129 25 4.12 
Poland 11.12 na na na 
Portugal 3.99 37,370 11 0.94 
Slovakia 1.20 na na na 
Slovenia 0.70 911 4 0.13 
Spain 16.88 538,410 48 3.19 
Sweden 5.50 101,967 246 1.85 
UK 29.60 238,356 99 0.81 
EU total 204.08 6,688,992 983 3.28 
(*) Incumbent's PSTN activated main lines; total supply of unbundled lines by incumbent to 
entrants (full unbundling, shared lines, and bitstream access); total number of agreements with 
entrants (full unbundling, shared lines, and bitstream access); unbundling penetration as total 
supply of unbundled lines by incumbent over incumbent's PSTN activated main lines (July 
2004).  
Source (except the unbundling penetration): European Commission (2004c), p. 73. 
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Note from table 3 that one of the frontrunners of deregulation, the UK, 
has one of the lowest unbundling penetration rates. There is also a large 
variation in the relative uptake of fully unbundled lines and shared lines 
across member states (implicit from tables 2 and 3). Countries like Germany 
and Italy show high shares of full unbundling. The Netherlands and Sweden 
show substantial numbers of line sharing. In Finland and France, line 
sharing and bitstream access are both important, in roughly equal 
proportions. 
Tables 2 and 3 may both give the impression of a relatively low level – 
compared to initial expectations – of unbundled lines by entrants in 2004. 
According to OECD (2003a), this slow progress is due to the detailed 
requirements related to implementing LLU, which have slowed down actual 
implementation arrangements. Another reason may be the fact that 
incumbents have been slow to upgrade their main distribution frames 17. 
This type of upgrading by the incumbent is necessary to make unbundling 
possible. However, the relatively low deployment statistics discussed above 
pertain to a single year, and hence contain no information on growth rates 
over time. Actually, the growth rate of LLU deployment has been quite high 
in some countries. In Germany, for instance, the ratio of unbundled loops to 
the total number of local loops increased from 0.27% in 1999 to 1.2% in 
2001, while in Denmark, it rose from 0.4% in 2000 to 1.0% in 2001.18 
European Commission (2004a) reports an increase of 110% in unbundled 
local loops (fully unbundled and shared lines) from 1.8 million (mid 2003) to 
more than 3.8 million (mid 2004) in the 15 pre-accession member states of 
the EU, which, according to the Commission, can be explained by 'decisive 
regulatory action', in particular related to pricing. A more recent illustration of 
the promise of a fast take-up of LLU is provided by France. In France, there 
were more than 1 million unbundled lines (primarily line sharing) in 
December 2004, which contrasts to 360,000 at the beginning of March 2004, 
and only 3,000 at the beginning of 2003 (Ofcom, 2004a, b). Overall, uptake 
was initially slow, but this was not necessarily a regulatory failure and, given 
the high growth rate, penetration may become much higher in the near 
future. 
To comment further on the growth of unbundling, we provide recent time-
series information for the Netherlands. See figure 1 for data on unbundled 
lines from January 2003 to December 2004. In the Netherlands, line sharing 
                     
17 OECD (2003a), table 8, p. 22. 
18 See data on the ‘unbundled ratio' in OECD (2003a), table 3, p. 20. 
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is the dominant type of LLU-access. Bitstream access is not used, while a 
relatively small number of lines are of the fully unbundled type.  
Figure 1: Unbundling in the Netherlands in the period January 2003-December 2004 
(monthly data) 
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Source: OPTA (non-confidential information obtained through private communication) 
One can see from figure 1 that, over a period of two years, penetration by 
entrants using LLU increased from close to zero to over 400,000 unbundled 
lines. The figure also illustrates the large gap between the number of 
'unbundled' lines (a misnomer) used by incumbent KPN itself, in order to 
offer broadband internet access as a retail product, and those (i.e., truly 
unbundled lines) used by its competitors. In absolute terms, this discrepancy 
has widened during the years 2003-2004: from the underlying data it can be 
seen that the gap grew from 328,778 in January 2003 to over 1 million 
unbundled lines in December 2004, if we restrict ourselves to line sharing. In 
relative terms, however, this is not the case, since entrants' share of the total 
installed base in line sharing increased from 12% to 20%. Nevertheless, 
KPN still has a strong lead in the broadband internet access market (if we 
ignore the position by cable companies, about which the figure does not 
provide any information). At this point, it is too early to say anything about 
the state of competition in the broadband market in the near future, also 
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because it is still uncertain which technologies will exhibit the highest take-
up 19. 
Since, to-date at least, entrants are using unbundling mainly as a means 
of offering broadband internet access, let us now focus more on this type of 
service. Table 4 gives a break-down of broadband retail lines. 
Table 4 (*) 
Country Incumbent's broadband lines  
Of which 
DSL lines 
Entrants' 
broadband lines 
Of which 
DSL  
Of which 
LLU 
Austria 249,400  249,400 456,325 106,325  106,325 
Belgium 731,825  731,809 712,848 157,485  85,669 
Cyprus  14,520  14,490 0 0  0 
Czech Rep  30,000  30,000 46,000 6,000  0 
Denmark  539,343  427,322 299,807 134,790  134,790 
Estonia  51,876  50,780 50,895 126  51 
Finland  411,800  306,600 160,300 93,400  93,400 
France  2,358,200  2,270,407 2,557,287 2,220,080  1,584,925 
Germany  4,704,906  4,700,000 710,341 586,141  586,141 
Greece  10,245  10,245 15,686 12,692  12,692 
Hungary  111,228 101,197 111,751 41,064  41,064 
Ireland  45,360  43,060 20,210 12,490  12,490 
Italy  2,475,881  2,455,802 1,043,916 767,386  766,673 
Latvia  27,427  26,815 6,477 0  0 
Lithuania  31,986  31,825 56,293 2,249  2,249 
Luxembourg  18,630  18,101 6,704 4,027  2,376 
Malta  4,511  4,511 9,227 6,915  0 
Netherlands  1,053,000  1,053,000 1,319,529 321,129  321,129 
Poland  181,501  181,501 10,806 10,806  0 
Portugal  530,422  260,341 137,128 37,383  37,383 
Slovakia  9,900  9,900 11,785 7,200  0 
Slovenia  54,236 52,929 22,103 911  911 
Spain  1,536,148  1,535,179 1,231,479 550,993  550,993 
Sweden  439,000  434,000 647,167 251,967  101,967 
UK  1,117,474  1,114,974 3,278,087 1,638,087  238,356 
EU total  16,738,819  16,114,188 12,922,151 6,969,646  4,679,584 
 (*) Incumbent's broadband retail lines; incumbent's DSL lines; entrants' broadband retail lines; 
new entrant's DSL lines; new entrant's DSL unbundled lines (full LLU, shared line, or bitstream 
access) (July 2004).  
Source: data reported in or calculated from European Commission (2004c), p. 74. 
One can make several observations from table 4. Compared to voice 
telephony (mentioned above), the market for broadband looks much more 
competitive. In a number of countries, incumbents serve less than half the 
broadband market. This includes countries with broadband penetration 
above the EU average, such as the United Kingdom, Austria, Sweden, the 
                     
19 In some cities, alternative local broadband networks based on WiFi are constructed as a 
means to bypass the incumbent's and cable companies' networks. 
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Netherlands, and France. Note that incumbents mostly offer DSL lines. In a 
few countries the incumbent also owns a cable operator and offers 
broadband by means of cable modems (notably in Denmark and Portugal). 
The type of competition from entrants is heterogeneous across countries. 
The entrants' access is overall more evenly spread between DSL and other 
means than for incumbents. At the EU level more consumers subscribe to 
entrants' DSL lines than to broadband access via other means.  
The other dominating form of access is cable. With respect to the 
entrants' DSL lines, resale of these lines plays an important role only in a 
small number of countries, most notably the United Kingdom. As can be 
seen from comparing the last column of table 4 with the second column, 
unbundling access currently constitutes an important role for competition in, 
for example, Denmark, the Netherlands, France, and Italy, to name a few 
countries. The European Commission (2004c) also provides data on the type 
of unbundling access for broadband. A similar pattern across countries 
emerges, as with respect to the availability of wholesale access, which is 
documented in table 2. 
With respect to broadband, we shall now discuss some national 
experiences in more detail 20. Denmark was an early mover with respect to 
LLU. Fully unbundled lines were mandated in 1998, and line-sharing in 
2001. By October 2001 entrants had gained a market share of 44% of DSL 
lines. Just over a year later (December 2002), their market share was down 
to 21%. Note that this does not imply that a large number of consumers 
switched back to the incumbent because the total market was increasing 
fast. However, the incumbent priced more competitively and entrants were 
no longer able to gain a large share of subscribers. Note also that in 
Denmark, LLU was not the only way for operators apart from the incumbent 
to offer broadband services. In addition, broadband is provided by upgraded 
cable television networks. Hence competition for the incumbent operator 
came from facility-based (cable operator Telia Stofa, a subsidiary of 
TeleSonera), as well as unbundling-based operators (in particular Tiscali 
and Cybercity) 21. 
Belgium has also experienced the important role of competition played by 
cable in the broadband market. Actually, it was cable operator Telenet that 
first offered high-speed internet access in 1997, followed by other players in 
                     
20 A large part of the information presented below is taken from ISMAIL & WU (2003). 
21 The other big cable operator is owned by the incumbent telecommunications operator. 
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1998 and 1999, and ahead of the incumbent telecommunications operator 
Belgacom, which only started to offer DSL services in 1999. Since almost all 
households have access to cable and DSL services, facilities-based 
competition is essentially in place in all geographical areas. In line with 
European regulation, LLU access was mandated in 2000. By 2002, some 
ISPs gained a combined 15% share of DSL subscribers through broadband 
access from Belgacom. 
The early success of cable operators in Belgium, and partly Denmark, 
contrasts with developments in the same period in Germany. Although a 
large majority of households (86% in 2002) also had access to cable in 
Germany, most of these cable networks did not offer high-speed internet 
access simply because the incumbent telecommunications operator 
Deutsche Telekom owned most cable networks. Any success in Germany 
with respect to LLU therefore has to be seen in light of the failure to establish 
facilities-based competition. 
Certainly, the regulated wholesale price, in relationship to actual costs, is 
an important factor determining different penetration rates in different 
countries and across different types of access. We therefore examine 
wholesale prices and, since we do not have cost data, draw some inferences 
from the incumbent's retail price. The most relevant price for LLU is the 
monthly line rental (or lease price) of a local loop charged by the incumbent, 
which is typically regulated. In addition, there may be co-location costs (e.g. 
the cost of renting space and power usage in the incumbent's premises) and 
a one-off cost for a line connection. As outlined previously, according to the 
New Regulatory Framework, the line rental should be cost-oriented. 
However, 'costs' are open to interpretation. Depending on the country, the 
line rental may include certain administrative, common and refurbishment 
costs. The line rental also depends on the type of unbundling (full 
unbundling, line sharing or bitstream access).  
Table 5 depicts the levels of line rentals and retail subscription fees for 
the cases of full unbundling and line sharing 22. As before, the international 
comparisons should also be interpreted with caution here. For instance, 
price differences may be caused by differences in service levels. 
                     
22 Data for bitstream access were not available. 
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Table 5 (*) 
Country Rental of fully unb. line 
Average total cost 
fully unb. line 
Rental of 
shared line 
Average total 
cost shared line 
Residential 
subscr. fee 
Austria 10.9 15.4 5.5 14.5 15.98 
Belgium 11.6 16.3 1.7   6.5 16.80 
Cyprus 11.7 17.0 7.3 14.0   9.97 
Czech Rep. 15.5 42.0 8.7 na   9.44 
Denmark   8.6 12.5 4.3   7.4 16.00 
Estonia   8.9 13.7 na na   6.26 
Finland 11.3 25.3 5.7 15.5 11.77 
France 10.5 17.1 2.9   9.4 13.00 
Germany 11.8 15.8 2.4   7.5 15.66 
Greece 10.4 13.4 5.2   9.1 12.38 
Hungary 11.8 24.4 4.3 16.9 12.86 
Ireland 16.8 26.9 9.0 19.3 24.18 
Italy   8.3 11.6 2.8   7.1 14.57 
Latvia   9.0 13.4 4.5   8.9   6.34 
Lithuania 12.5 20.4 6.7 16.8   6.66 
Luxembourg 15.8 31.3 7.5 23.9 18.40 
Malta na na na na   6.56 
Netherlands   9.6 12.0 1.9   5.0 18.16 
Poland na na na na   9.71 
Portugal 12.0 19.0 3.0 10.3 15.07 
Slovakia na na na na 7.39 
Slovenia 15.3 21.5 7.0 12.8 10.70 
Spain 11.4 13.2 3.0   5.5 15.28 
Sweden 11.4 25.3 5.4 15.4 13.75 
UK 13.3 24.4 3.4 13.9 16.84 
EU average 11.2 17.5 3.3 10.0 14.40 
(*) Monthly line rental of fully unbundled lines; monthly average cost per fully unbundled line; 
monthly line rental of shared lines; monthly average cost per shared line; monthly residential 
subscription fee (in EUR, August 2004).  
Monthly average total costs are equal to the monthly rental plus 1/12 of the one-off connection 
fee. Prices exclude co-location costs. 
Source: European Commission (2004c), figures 76-79, 83 
Note from table 5 that the line rental of a shared line is typically less than 
half the price of a fully unbundled line. Related to this observation is the fact 
that line sharing allows the incumbent to remain active as a supplier of voice 
telephony, contrary to the case of full unbundling. Furthermore, in some 
countries (Czech Rep., Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia), the line 
rental for full unbundling is higher than the retail subscription fee for 
residential customers. Such a situation, which can be characterized as a 
'price squeeze', makes it impossible for a LLU-based entrant to make 
positive profits from (only) selling voice telephony subscriptions to end-users 
(provided that it sets similar per-minute prices to those charged by the 
incumbent). Price squeezes seem to be becoming less common, however, 
due to ex ante regulatory intervention or ex post control by the competition 
authority. Indeed, we do not find indications for a price squeeze in the 15 
pre-accession member states of the EU. In particular, the price squeezes in 
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Germany and the UK, which were present in 2002 (OECD 2003b, table 6.20, p. 
189), have now disappeared 23. 
Clearly, a price squeeze is not very promising for entrants to profitably 
penetrate the market. However, it would be wrong to conclude that the 
difference between the incumbent's retail price and the wholesale price it is 
allowed to charge for access adequately explains the penetration across 
countries. A 'well-behaved' example is Italy, where the uptake of fully 
unbundled lines has been quite high, in combination with a relatively low 
level of the line rental for this type of unbundling. The uptake in Germany, 
however, seems to be higher than one would expect by considering the level 
of the wholesale price. Similarly, some countries with a high take-up of line 
sharing have had a low line rental (for example, France, the Netherlands), 
while others (such as Sweden), had known a relatively high wholesale 
price 24. Indeed, several additional factors, particularly the availability of 
alternative direct access, are important in explaining cross-country 
differences. 
?  Challenges for policy and regulation 
Most of the regulatory challenges and pitfalls of LLU are well known. 
According to The Economist: 
"How best to promote competition over the local loop is by far the most 
controversial topic in telecoms regulation. Ideally, competitors would 
put an end to the incumbents' local-loop monopoly by building their 
own networks. But building a competing network with the same reach 
is hugely expensive and time-consuming. [...] over the past few years, 
most of the developed world has been asking incumbents to share 
their networks with rivals—technically known as "local loop unbundling" 
(LLU). This means treating the incumbents as a special case and 
regulating them in an "asymmetric" way, at least until competing 
networks have been constructed. By allowing competitors to lease or 
resell lines, regulators have been able to foster competition in both 
telephony and broadband access." (The Economist, "Untangling the 
local loop", Telecoms Survey, Oct. 9th 2003). 
                     
23 In 2003, the European Commission fined Deutsche Telekom for eliminating the margin that 
entrants need to compete for end-users (see the Commission's press release "Commission 
fines Deutsche Telekom for charging anti-competitive tariffs for access to its local networks", 
IP/03/717, 21/05/2003). 
24 See also OFCOM (2004a, b) for cross-country comparisons. 
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While LLU-access certainly is a means for entrants to offer direct access, 
we have seen in the previous section that no simple conclusions from the 
European experience emerge with respect to the effect of lease prices on 
competition. Clearly, if LLU is not offered and there are no alternatives for 
direct access, competition cannot result. Hence, from a short-term 
perspective, regulatory intervention to guarantee direct access at reasonable 
rates furthers competition. However, when speaking of competition, we 
mainly refer to retail prices or the level of market penetration by entrants. 
The latter seems a more appropriate indicator to us, because the lack of 
competitors is often accompanied by retail price regulation, meaning that the 
level of retail prices contains little information about the degree of 
competition in a market. The question is then to what extent LLU lease price 
regulation affects market penetration. Again, the data presented in the 
previous section does not give a clear answer. From a theoretical 
perspective, we would expect a lease price increase that is at least partly 
shifted to the retail segment. In the extreme case that the entrant does not 
generate additional demand for subscriptions (only creating cannibalization 
effects as in the case of fixed voice telephony), the theoretical prediction is 
that a lease price increase translates one-to-one into higher retail 
subscription fees (DE BIJL & PEITZ, 2004b). This implies that lease price 
regulation is actually neutral to competition in the sense that the market 
share of the incumbent is not affected and that the entrant is indifferent to 
the level of the lease price, provided that the total number of subscribers 
remains constant. This may be a reasonable approximation for fixed voice 
telephony and implies that LLU is rather ineffective in stimulating competition 
for voice telephony. Our understanding is that current demand for broadband 
access by end-users is much more price-elastic. This means that lower 
broadband prices draw additional consumers into the market. If this is the 
case, LLU regulation has a greater impact on penetration by entrants for 
broadband than for voice telephony (DE BIJL & PEITZ, 2004b). Therefore, it 
seems important for regulators to explore the difference in regulatory impact 
between voice and broadband. 
Apart from understanding the effectiveness of LLU lease price regulation, 
it is important to understand the direction of LLU-regulation and how it fits 
into the more general picture of regulation within telecommunications. There 
are several reasons why we would like to stress this. 
Firstly, suppose for the sake of the argument that narrowband is for voice 
and broadband for data, and that fixed and mobile telephony are two 
separate markets. With respect to broadband, regulators should 
consequently ask: do most consumers wish to have fast broadband 
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connections that can increasingly be used to demand innovative services, 
such as movies on demand? Or is there perhaps little need for such 
advanced products, and do consumers care more for decent speed at low 
prices? The answer to these questions is of major importance for unbundling 
policy. To address these questions, the regulator needs to develop an 
understanding of the preferences of end-users, potentially even about 
services which do not yet exist. If the answer to the first question, but not the 
second one, is affirmative, wholesale regulation of the local loop should 
encourage full unbundling and line sharing and discourage bitstream and 
simple resale access. However, if the answers are the opposite, then 
regulation should respond accordingly and, in particular, make bitstream 
access and simple resale access (e.g. wholesale line rental) available at low 
wholesale prices. 
We should add that the regulatory problem may be somewhat different. It 
seems likely that entrants will opt for a 'dual play' strategy, namely a strategy 
offering a bundle of voice and broadband internet access services. In itself, 
voice may not be sufficiently profitable, but coupled with broadband it is a 
means to fully break consumers' ties with the incumbent. As a result, there 
may even be a strong increase in the number of fully unbundled lines used 
by entrants in countries that have so far known an uptake of mainly line 
sharing or bitstream access, as it allows them to offer such bundles and 
completely take over end-users. Moreover, the picture becomes more 
complex as 'triple play' may become the nature of the game, consisting of 
bundles of voice, broadband internet access and video. In the Netherlands, 
for instance, incumbent KPN is already active in the provision of all three 
services (offering digital TV, as an alternative to cable, by providing an 
antenna to consumers for a wireless connection). 
Secondly, unbundling is part of the broader issue of infrastructure-based 
versus retail-based competition. That is, an important question for regulation 
is whether full network duplication, no duplication of the local access network 
but investment duplication in technology at the local loop (DSL by entrants), 
or not even this type of investment duplication is desirable. Again, the 
answer to this question should depend on the preferences of end-users and, 
of course, the economic costs of undertaking such investments. The current 
economic costs depend on general country factors (such as geography, 
GDP etc.), as well as telecommunications specific factors such as whether 
cable networks are already in place. In the longer run, infrastructure-based 
competition is likely to require less regulatory intervention and, therefore, the 
social costs of regulation appear to be smaller. However, it is not clear 
whether competition between two (or three) operators with full-access 
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networks (say the incumbent and a cable operator) is seen as sufficiently 
competitive 25. If not, even with infrastructure-based competition, regulation 
may be desirable so that the regulator has to stay active with respect to LLU 
even in the long run. To summarize, access-based entry modes (LLU and 
CS) may remain important as a means to increase the intensity of 
competition at the retail level. As a downside, such regulation may reduce 
investment incentives 26. 
Thirdly, the distinction between voice and broadband (for data) is 
becoming less useful as IP-based voice telephony gains ground. An 
important question for regulators is consequently how regulation is affected 
by developments related to IP-based voice telephony (VoIP, VoDSL). 
Should VoIP be subject to the same regulations as voice telephony? At the 
time this paper was written, the European Regulators Group (ERG) had 
decided, for the time being, to abstain from intervening at a European level 
in the IP-based voice telephony 27 28. The ERG expects that VoIP, if not 
hindered by regulations (such as those designed for 'traditional' telephony 
services), will lead to strong reductions in the price of voice services. 
Similarly, cheaper VoIP-based services may have a strong effect on the 
uptake of broadband internet access. It is worth noting that low line rentals 
for line sharing and bitstream access indirectly facilitate the uptake of VoIP, 
and hence may act as an accelator for competition in voice telephony. 
Clearly, the emergence of VoIP will pose a whole range of regulatory 
challenges. 
Fourthly, there is a fundamental way in which VoIP relates to the static 
versus dynamic efficiency tradeoff. In addition to competition through LLU, 
                     
25 In several European countries cable operators have partly upgraded their network to offer 
high-speed internet access (see also the previous section). Other networks such as Ethernet 
LAN are available only for few households in the EU. Hence, without LLU, only one or two 
operators (the incumbent or incumbent plus one entrant) could offer direct access. 
26 Recall that LLU-regulation of operators with SMP is in general cost-oriented. As mentioned 
in section 2, the lease price should include a reasonable return on investment. Note that 
innovative and risky new services require a higher rate of return than less risky, less innovative 
services. This means that even cost-oriented access regulation leaves room for the regulator to 
decide whether it wants to encourage or discourage infrastructure investments. The regulator 
simply has to adapt its definition of cost-orientation. 
27 ERG (2005). See also the ERG press release of February 11th, 2005. 
28 Exceptions are that the issue of telephone numbers must be technology-independent (so 
that VoIP-providers cannot use region-independent codes), and that emergency numbers must 
be accessible through VoIP. NRAs are still free to intervene, so the development of VoIP may 
follow different paths among member states, if different regulations are applied througout the 
EU. 
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wireless local access networks (WLANs), wireless local broadband networks 
based on the WiFi protocol, and also the third generation of mobile 
telephony (UMTS), can also help to introduce local competition in the 
broadband market. Given that these types of networks are packet-switched 
broadband networks, they can also be used for VoIP-based telephony.29 
Hence, the emergence of VoIP stimulates the growth of different types of 
ways of reaching end-users. At some point, it may happen that the local 
access networks of incumbents cease to be the primary way of connecting 
customers, but just one out of a whole variety of equally effective ways. LLU-
regulation has to respond to this type of convergence. 
?  Conclusion 
Unbundling of the local access network has sometimes been called a 
failure. Looking at the deployment of full unbundling to allow entrants to 
(directly) offer fixed voice telephony to their customers, this may indeed be 
the case. Presumably, the profitability of plain voice telephony is just too low, 
compared to the total cost associated with leasing (fully unbundled) local 
lines from an incumbent.  
Unbundling, however, has a large potential as a means to offer 
broadband access to end-users for entrants without local networks. Line 
sharing and bitstream access are types of unbundling that allow entrants to 
offer this service, while keeping the incumbent in sufficient control of its local 
lines so that it can continue to use them to offer voice telephony. The uptake 
of these forms of unbundling has been relatively succesful. Moreover, as 
VoDSL and VoIP gain ground, the intensity of competition in voice telephony 
can be expected to increase in the near future, despite the 'failure' of full 
unbundling to break open the market for fixed voice telephony. 
Overall, unbundling is likely to lead to more competition in 
telecommunications services, probably faster than would have happened 
without regulatory intervention. The question is, however, whether this is 
good for welfare not only in the short run, but also in the longer run. Does 
mandatory unbundling create a path for entrants to build up market share 
quickly during the time that they need to roll out their own networks? Or does 
                     
29 For the sake of the argument, here we primarily view UMTS as a local access network for 
broadband Internet. 
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it eliminate their incentives to connect end-users themselves? If the latter is 
true, is this good or bad for welfare? What kind of competition and what sort 
of innovation and variety offered by operators, does society value most? 
This fundamental question should underly policy and regulation on 
unbundling. It could also be very interesting, as well as important for policy 
makers, to compare the European regulatory model with a fundamentally 
different approach, such as the one in South Korea, namely without network-
sharing regulation 30. Overall, despite considerable experience with 
unbundling of the local loop throughout Europe, some fundamental 
dilemmas and uncertainties are still to be resolved. 
                     
30 Apparently, in South Korea this has led to fierce facilities-based competition, characterized 
by substantial investments in fiber-optic cables as well as a fast adoption process, in the Korean 
broadband market. See "Bringing the Broadband Miracle to Europe", The Wall Street Journal, 
October 11th, 2004. 
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